family law, Reporting restrictions, child sex exploitation, human rights, jurisdictional law, Birmingham City Council v Riaz
Reporting
restrictions and child sex exploitation
The two judgments of Keehan J in child sexual exploitation
(CSE), and later reporting restrictions order (RRO), cases provide food for
thought on a variety of aspects of family law, human rights and jurisdictional
law (extent of a High Court judge’s inherent jurisdiction). The second of the
two cases,
Birmingham City Council v Riaz, AB and Others [2015] EWHC 1857 (Fam), [2015] 2 FLR (forthcoming), and the case under consideration here,
raises the following questions:
- Is the High Court entitled in exceptional
circumstances to make a life-time reporting restrictions order (‘RRO’) to
restrict publicity for the adult life of a child, say a survivor of CSE; and if
so
- What types of facts and back-ground might
justify such an order?
In December 2014 in
Birmingham City Council v Riaz and Others [2014] EWHC 4247 (Fam), [2015] 2 FLR (forthcoming) the first of the two
cases, Keehan J made an order against 10 men to prevent their sexual
involvement with a 17-year-old girl (AB). He held that he could make the order
in his inherent jurisdiction on an application by AB’s local authority relating
to the CSE inflicted on her. His order included a RRO for AB to last till she
was 18 years old, in August 2015. No RRO was made in respect of her
assailants though whether such an order should be made was part of the court’s
consideration.
In
Birmingham City
Council v Riaz, AB and Others
(above; ‘
Riaz, AB’
), Keehan J considered an application, by the City Council
with support from AB, that the RRO made by him in December 2014 should
last for AB’s lifetime. Those newspapers represented before Keehan J The
Press Association and Time Newspapers Ltd) said they had no intention of
reporting on AB nor intruding on her privacy; but they were concerned, as their
advocate explained (quoted by Keehan J at para [35]), at
the exceptional nature of the order the court was being asked to make:
‘… the concern is that for the court to
make an order such as that requested would be an extraordinary, exceptional,
and, we submit, unjustified extension of the court's use of its jurisdiction,
and an unwarranted and unjustifiable intrusion on and limitation of the public
and the media's rights to freedom of expression under Article 10. The concern
of the PA and TNL is that if the court makes an order in a case such as this, it
will extend the range of injunctions available to local authorities far beyond
anything considered in [earlier cases]. An injunction would leave the press
bound for the rest of AB's life.’
Jurisdiction
In
Riaz, AB the first question for the
court was, given the imminence of AB’s 18th birthday: had the court any
jurisdiction to continue the RRO beyond that birthday? This resolved itself
into whether the court had jurisdiction to make an order at all; and if so,
whether it should be applied in respect of AB.
In
Re S (Identification: Restrictions on
Publication)
[2004] UKHL 47, [2005] 1 FLR 591 Lord Steyn stressed the extent
of existing statutory provision (cited by Keehan J at para [26]):
‘[20] There are
numerous automatic statutory reporting restrictions, e.g. in favour of victims
of sexual offences: see, for example, section 1 of the Sexual Offences
(Amendment) Act 1992. There are also numerous statutory provisions, which
provide for discretionary reporting restrictions: see, for example, section
8(4) of the Official Secrets Act 1920. Given the number of statutory
exceptions, it needs to be said clearly and unambiguously that the court has no
power to create by a process of analogy, except in the most compelling
circumstances, further exceptions to the general principle of open justice.’
Lifetime order in
damages approval cases
Early on in his judgement Keehan J referred to
JX MX v Dartford & Gravesham NHS Trust and Others [2015] EWCA Civ 96 in which the
Court of Appeal had recently explained
how, at common law, the open justice principle can be overridden (for short
commentary see
https://dbfamilylaw.wordpress.com/2015/02/19/a-simple-law-for-privacy-in-children-cases/). A mother was concerned at her and her daughter’s
loss of privacy following court approval of her substantial damages settlement.
The Court of Appeal set out clear statements of principle in favour of open
justice from cases such as
Scott v
Scott
[1913] AC 417, and
A v
British Broadcasting Corporation
[2014] UKSC 25. However, the court
concluded that the criterion for a decision as to whether a RRO should be made
was whether it was ‘necessary’ to derogate from the principle of open justice (paras [33]
and [34]); and that in this type of case – ‘dealing with… essentially private
business’ the claimant was entitled to a RRO. Generally such orders should be
made for a protected party in a case such as that of
JXMX, subject to the press having a chance to object in an
individual case.
Keehan J sets out his view of the
JXMX decision as follows:
‘[13] … the decision reflects the
emphasis the courts now place on the need to accord due respect to the Article
8 rights of litigants, especially of children, young people and protected
parties balanced against the Article 10 rights of the press and broadcast
media. The position is encapsulated in the observation of Moore-Bick LJ when he
said:
The public undoubtedly has an interest in knowing how
that function is performed and the principle of open justice has an important
part to play in ensuring that it is performed properly, but its nature is such
that the public interest may usually be served without the need for disclosure
of the claimant's identity.
I respectfully agree.’
He considered the cases where RROs had been made to protect a new
identity (Thompson and Venables, Mary Bell and Maxine Carr) (§§[14]-[18]) and to the
age limitations – to 18 for any reporting restriction on a child in court
proceedings – in Children and Young Person's Act 1939, s 39
(R (ota JC and RT) v The Central Criminal Court and
others
[2014]
EWCA Civ 1777). He drew attention (§[20]) to
the fact the
ota JC and RT case had
led to a life reporting direction protection being granted for life to under 18
witnesses and victims in criminal proceedings (Youth Justice and Criminal
Evidence Act 1999, s 45(2) and (3)).
Conclusion and reporting restrictions order
The passage from Lord Steyn’s opinion in
Re S (above) had been cited to the judge
by the advocate for the press. In response Keehan J drew attention to Lord
Steyn’s concluding exception for ‘the most compelling circumstances’ (para
[27]) for his being able to find further exceptions to the open justice
principle. He went on:
‘[28]
In my judgment, however, two matters are plain:
a) a high priority is
given by Parliament to young victims or witnesses in criminal proceedings and
to the victims of sexual offences and of female genital mutilation; and
b) as I repeat, the
approach of the courts has advanced over the course of the last decade or so to
protect the Convention rights of litigants in civil proceedings as most
recently exemplified by the decision of the Court of Appeal in JXMX above.’
The judge held that he was entitled to make a life-time RRO,
even though AB would no longer be a child for most of the period it covered.
Should he do so in AB’s case?
In making this decision the judge must balance the private
interests of AB against the public interest in freedom of expression. He
addressed the public interests – as advocated by the press representative – as
against AB’s private interests as follows:
‘[40] It is plainly in the public
interest that the press and broadcast media are able to report proceedings
concerning cases of CSE. The public have a right to know how local authorities,
child protection services, the police and the courts approach and deal with
such cases. It was for that reason that I gave a judgment in public last
December and ordered that each of the respondents should be identified.
[41] What, however, is in the public
interest in identifying AB as a victim of CSE? I confess I can see no such
interest at all.
[42] AB is entitled to respect for
her private life. What could be more private and personal than the fact that
she has been the victim of CSE? I am satisfied that the fact she has been the
victim of CSE is entirely a private and personal matter for AB. If, once she
has attained her majority or thereafter, she wishes to make it known that she
is a victim of CSE, that must be a matter for her and her alone.’
He concluded from this that these private interests of AB
overrode any public interest there might be in press publicity:
‘[46] I have carefully balanced the
competing Article 8 and Article 10 rights. On the basis that I find no public
interest in identifying AB as a victim of CSE and I find that there are
compelling reasons why AB's history of being a victim of CSE should remain
confidential and private to her, I am completely satisfied that the balance
falls decisively in favour of granting the lifelong RRO sought by the local
authority.’
Public interest in
victims being encouraged to come forward
Finally the judge emphasised the public interest of the
importance of victims of CSE coming forward if they might be capable of being
guaranteed life-time reporting restrictions (though each case will depend on
its individual facts (injunction applications to be ‘determined on their own
merits’: italicised passage below).
‘[47] I further consider that there
is a high public interest in supporting the victims of CSE to come forward and
report their abuse to the authorities and to co-operate with them. Whilst the
issue of lifelong RROs in possible future
CSE injunction cases will have to be determined on their own merits, there
is a very real risk, in my judgment, that my refusal to grant a RRO in this
case, might deter other young victims of CSE from coming forward to the
authorities. In principle I propose to make a RRO in favour of AB for her
lifetime.’
Each case will depend on its own facts: the public/private
balance must be tested in each instance. However, if Keehan J is followed – and
he explains why he considers that the common law in 2015 is with him – then
children, who may justify continued anonymity (including survivors of child
sexual abuse), can seek orders for restrictions of the reporting of their cases
beyond childhood.
A final word can perhaps be referred back to
JXMX (see above) where the Court of Appeal said that the criterion
for a decision as to whether a RRO should be made was whether it was
‘necessary’ to derogate from the principle of open justice. The court concluded
that group of cases could be identified where a protected party should
automatically have a life-time RRO, subject to the press having a chance to
object in an individual case. Could a similar approach be adopted by the courts
for CSE survivors?
The views expressed by contributing authors are not necessarily those of Family Law or Jordan Publishing and should not be considered as legal advice.
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